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Abstract
The paper proposes a way to add marketing into the standard thresh-
old model of social networks. Within this framework, the paper studies
logical properties of the influence relation between sets of agents in social
networks. Two different forms of this relation are considered: one for pro-
motional marketing and the other for preventive marketing. In each case
a sound and complete logical system describing properties of the influ-
ence relation is proposed. Both systems could be viewed as extensions of
Armstrong’s axioms of functional dependency from the database theory.
1 Introduction
1.1 Social Networks
In this paper we study how diffusion in social networks could be affected by mar-
keting. Diffusion happens when a product or a social norm is initially adopted
by a small group of agents who later influence their peers to adopt the same
product. The peers influence their peers, and so on. There are two most com-
monly used models of diffusion: the cascading model and the threshold model.
In the cascading model [12, 8] the behaviour of agents is random and the peer
influence manifests itself in a change of a probability of an agent to adopt the
product. In the threshold model [16, 9, 7, 1], originally introduced by Granovet-
ter [6] and Schelling [13], the behavior of the agents is deterministic.
The focus of this paper is on the threshold model of diffusion of a given
product. In this model, there is a threshold value θ(a) associated with each
agent a and an influence value w(a, b) associated with each pair of agents a
and b. Informally, the threshold value θ(a) represents the resistance of agent a
to adoption of the product and the influence value w(a, b) represents the peer
pressure that agent a puts on agent b upon adopting the product. If the total
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peer pressure from the set of agents A who have already adopted the product
on an agent b is no less than the threshold value θ(b), i.e.,∑
a∈A
w(a, b) ≥ θ(b), (1)
then agent b also adopts the product.
1.2 Influence Relation
We say that a set of agents A influences a set of agents B if the social network
is such that an adoption of the product by all agents in set A will unavoidably
lead to an adoption of the product by all agents in set B. Note that it is not
important how original adoption of the product by agents in set A happens. For
example, agents in set A can receive and start using free samples of the product.
Also, agents in set A can influence agents in set B indirectly. If agents in set
A put enough peer pressure on some other agents to adopt the product, who in
turn put enough peer pressure on the agents in set B to adopt the product, we
still say that set A influences set B. We denote this influence relation by AB.
In this paper we focus on universal principles of influence that are true for all
social networks. The set of such principles for a fixed distribution of influence
values has been studied by Azimipour and Naumov [3], who provided a complete
axiomatization of these principles that consists of the following three axioms of
influence:
1. Reflexivity: AB, where B ⊆ A,
2. Augmentation: AB → (A,C B,C),
3. Transitivity: AB → (B  C → A C),
and an additional fourth axiom describing a property specific to the fixed dis-
tribution of influence values. In these axioms, A,B denotes the union of sets
A and B. The three axioms above were originally proposed by Armstrong [2]
to describe functional dependence relation in database theory. They became
known in database literature as Armstrong’s axioms [5, p. 81]. Va¨a¨na¨nen pro-
posed a first order version of these principles [14]. Beeri, Fagin, and Howard [4]
suggested a variation of Armstrong’s axioms that describes properties of multi-
valued dependence. Naumov and Nicholls [10] proposed another variation of
these axioms that describes a rationally functional dependence.
There have been at least two different attempts to enrich the language of
Armstring’s axioms by introducing an additional parameter to the functional
dependence relation. Va¨a¨na¨nen [15] studied approximate dependence relation
ApB, where p refers to the fraction of “exceptions” in which functional depen-
dence does not hold. In our previous work [11], we interpreted relation Ap B
as “knowing values of database attributes A and having an additional budget
p one can reconstruct the values of attributes in set B”. In the current paper
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we interpret A p B as the influence relation in social networks with parame-
ter p referring to the available marketing budget to either promote or prevent
influence.
1.3 Marketing Impact
We propose an extension of the threshold model that incorporates marketing.
This is done by representing a marketing campaign as a non-negative spending
function s, where s(b) specifies the amount of money spent on marketing the
product to agent b. In addition, we associate a value λ(b) with each agent b,
which we call the propensity of agent b. This value represents the resistance
of agent b to marketing. The higher the value of the propensity is, the more
responsive the agent is to the marketing. We modify formula (1) to say that
agent b adopts the product if the total sum of the marketing pressure and the
peer pressure from the set of agents who have already adopted the product is
no less than the threshold value:
λ(b) · s(b) +
∑
a∈A
w(a, b) ≥ θ(b). (2)
In the first part of this paper we assume that the goal of marketing is to pro-
mote the adoption of the product. In the second part of the paper we investigate
marketing campaigns designed to prevent adoption of the product. An example
of the second type of campaign is an anti-smoking advertisement campaign. In
either of these two cases, the same equation (2) describes the condition under
which the product is adopted by agent b.
Note that most people would be more likely to buy a product when they
are exposed to a promotional marketing campaign. That is, in case of promo-
tional marketing, the value of the propensity is usually positive. On the other
hand, people are usually less likely to buy a product or to adopt a social norm
after being exposed to preventive marketing. In other words, in the preventive
marketing setting, the value of the propensity is usually negative. However,
our framework is general enough to allow for the propensity value to be either
positive or negative in both of these cases.
While studying the marketing that promotes adoption of the product, we
interpret predicate A p B as “there is a marketing campaign with budget no
more than p that guarantees that the set of agents A will influence the set of
agents B”. As we show, the following three modified Armstrong’s axioms give a
sound and complete axiomatization of universal propositional properties of this
relation:
1. Reflexivity: Ap B, where B ⊆ A,
2. Augmentation: Ap B → A,C p B,C,
3. Transitivity: Ap B → (B q C → Ap+q C).
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These axioms are identical to our axioms of budget-constrained functional de-
pendence [11].
In the case of marketing that aims to prevent the influence, one would natu-
rally be interested in considering relation “there is a marketing campaign with
budget no more than p that guarantees that the set of agents A will not influ-
ence the set of agents B”. Equivalently, one can study the properties of the
negation of this relation, or, in other words, the properties of the relation “for
any preventive marketing campaign with budget no more than p, the set of
agents A is able to influence the set of agents B”. We have chosen to study the
latter relation because the axiomatic system for this relation is more elegant. In
this paper we show that the following four axioms give a sound and complete
axiomatization of the latter relation:
1. Reflexivity: Ap B, where B ⊆ A,
2. Augmentation: Ap B → A,C p B,C,
3. Transitivity: Ap B → (B p C → Ap C),
4. Monotonicity: Ap B → Aq B, where q ≤ p.
The difference between the axiomatic systems for promotional marketing
and preventive marketing is in transitivity and monotonicity axioms. Both sys-
tems include a form of transitivity axiom, but these forms are different and
not equivalent. The system for preventive marketing contains a form of mono-
tonicity axiom. For promotional marketing, the following form of monotonicity
axiom is true and provable, as is shown in Lemma 7:
Ap B → Aq B, where p ≤ q.
Both of the above axiomatic systems differ from Va¨a¨na¨nen [15] axiomatization
of approximate functional dependence.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we give formal definitions of a
social network and of a diffusion in such networks. We also prove basic properties
of diffusion used later in the paper. This section of the paper is common to both
promotional and preventive marketing. In Section 3, we introduce semantics
of promotional marketing, give axioms of our logical system for promotional
marketing and prove the soundness and the completeness of this logical system.
In Section 4, we do the same for preventive marketing. Section 5 concludes the
paper.
2 Social Networks
As discussed in the introduction, the threshold model of a social network is
specified by a non-negative influence value between any pair of agents in the
network and by a threshold value for each agent. Additionally, each agent is
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assigned a propensity value that specifies the resistance of the agent to mar-
keting. The value of the propensity could be positive, zero, or negative. We
assume that the set of agents is finite.
Definition 1 A social network is a tuple (A, w, λ, θ), where
1. Set A is a finite set of agents.
2. Function w maps A × A into the set of non-negative real numbers. The
value w(a, b) represents the “influence” of agent a on agent b.
3. Function λ maps A into real numbers. The value of λ(a) represents the
“propensity” of an agent a to marketing.
4. “Threshold” function θ maps A into the set of real numbers.
Figure 1 illustrates Definition 1. In this figure, the set of agents is the set
{u, v, w, t, x, y, z}. The influence value w(a, b) is specified by the label on the
directed edge from a to b. The edges for which the influence value is zero are
omitted. Threshold and propensity values are shown next to each agent.
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Figure 1: A Social Network.
We describe a marketing campaign by specifying “spending” on advertise-
ment to each agent in the social network.
Definition 2 For any social network (A, w, λ, θ), a spending function is an
arbitrary function from set A into non-negative real numbers.
The following is an example of a spending function for the social network de-
picted in Figure 1. This function specifies a marketing campaign targeting
exclusively agent t.
s(a) =
{
3, if a = t,
0, otherwise.
(3)
Definition 3 For any social network (A, w, λ, θ) and any spending function s,
let ‖s‖ = ∑a∈A s(a).
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For the spending function defined by equation (3), we have ‖s‖ = 3.
Next we formally define the diffusion in social network under marketing
campaign specified by a spending function s. Suppose that initially the product
is adopted by a set of agent A. We recursively define the diffusion chain of sets
of agents
A = A0s ⊆ A1s ⊆ A2s ⊆ A3s ⊆ . . . ,
where Aks is the set of agents who have adopted the product on or before the
k-th step of the diffusion.
Definition 4 For any given social network (A, w, λ, θ), any spending function
s, and any subset A ⊆ A, let set Ans be recursively defined as follows:
1. A0s = A,
2. An+1s = A
n
s ∪
{
b ∈ A | λ(b) · s(b) +∑a∈Ans w(a, b) ≥ θ(b)}.
For example, consider again the social network depicted in Figure 1. Let A
be the set {v} and s be the spending function defined by equation (3). Note that
the threshold value of agent u in this network is zero and, thus, it will adopt the
product without any peer or marketing pressure. For the other agents in this
network, the combination of the marketing pressure specified by the marketing
function s and the peer pressure from agent v is not enough to adopt the product.
Thus, A1s = {v, u}. Once agent v and agent u both adopt the product, their
combined peer pressure on agent w reaches the threshold value of w and agent
w also adopts the product. No other agent is experiencing enough pressure to
adopt the product at this point. Hence, A2s = {v, u, w}. Next, agent t will
adopt the product due to the combination of the peer pressure from agent w
and the marketing pressure specified by the spending function s, and so on.
This diffusion process is illustrated in Figure 2.
Corollary 1 (Ans )
k
s = A
n+k
s for each social network (A, w, λ, θ), each n, k ≥ 0,
each set A ⊆ A, and each spending function s.
Definition 5 A∗s =
⋃
n≥0A
n
s .
Corollary 2 A ⊆ A∗s for each social network (A, w, λ, θ), each spending func-
tion s, and each subset A ⊆ A.
In the rest of this section we establish technical properties of the chain
{Ans }n≥0 and the set A∗s that are used later. The first of these properties
is a corollary that follows from the assumption of the finiteness of set A in
Definition 1.
Corollary 3 For any social network (A, w, λ, θ), any subset A of A and any
spending function s, there is n ≥ 0 such that A∗s = Ans .
Next, we prove that A∗s is an idempotent operator.
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Figure 2: Diffusion Chain A1s ⊆ A2s ⊆ A2s ⊆ A4s.
Lemma 1 (A∗s)
∗
s ⊆ A∗s for each social network (A, w, λ, θ), each spending func-
tion s, and each subsets A of A.
Proof. By Corollary 3, there is n ≥ 0 such that A∗s = Ans . By the same corollary,
there also is k ≥ 0 such that (Ans )∗s = (Ans )ks . Thus, by Corollary 1,
(A∗s)
∗
s = (A
n
s )
∗
s = (A
n
s )
k
s = A
n+k
s .
Therefore, (A∗s)
∗
s ⊆ A∗s by Definition 5. 
We now show that any set of agents influences at least as many agents as any
of its subsets, given the same fixed spending function. This claim is formally
stated as Corollary 4 that follows from the next lemma:
Lemma 2 If A ⊆ B, then Aks ⊆ Bks , for each social network (A, w, λ, θ), each
spending function s, each k ≥ 0, and all subsets A and B of A.
Proof. We prove the statement of the lemma by induction on k. If k = 0, then
A0s = A ⊆ B = B0s by Definition 4.
Suppose that Aks ⊆ Bks . Let x ∈ Ak+1s . It suffices to show that x ∈ Bk+1s .
Indeed, by Definition 4, assumption x ∈ Ak+1s implies that either x ∈ Aks or
λ(x) · s(x) +∑a∈Aks w(a, x) ≥ θ(x). When x ∈ Aks , by the induction hypothesis,
x ∈ Aks ⊆ Bks . Thus, x ∈ Bks . Therefore, x ∈ Bk+1s by Definition 4.
When λ(x) · s(x) +∑a∈Aks w(a, x) ≥ θ(x), due to the assumption Ak ⊆ Bk,
λ(x) · s(x) +
∑
b∈Bks
w(b, x) ≥ λ(x) · s(x) +
∑
a∈Aks
w(a, x) ≥ θ(x).
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Therefore, x ∈ Bk+1s by Definition 4. 
Corollary 4 If A ⊆ B, then A∗s ⊆ B∗s , for each social network (A, w, λ, θ),
each spending function s, and all subsets A and B of A.
Next, we establish that the influence of the union of two sets of agents is at least
as strong as the combination of the influence of these two sets.
Lemma 3 A∗s∪B∗s ⊆ (A∪B)∗s, for each social network (A, w, λ, θ), each spend-
ing function s, and all subsets A and B of A.
Proof. Note that A ⊆ A ∪ B and B ⊆ A ∪ B. Thus, A∗s ⊆ (A ∪ B)∗s and
B∗s ⊆ (A ∪B)∗s by Corollary 4. Therefore, A∗s ∪B∗s ⊆ (A ∪B)∗s. 
One might intuitively think that the result of two consecutive marketing
campaigns can not be more effective than the combined campaign, or, in other
terms, that (A∗s1)
∗
s2 ⊆ A∗s1+s2 . More careful analysis shows that this claim is
true only if all agents have non-negative propensity. However, this property can
be restated in the form which is true for negative propensity as well. To do this,
we introduce a binary operation ⊕λ on spending functions.
Definition 6 For any two spending functions s1 and s2 and any propensity
function λ, let s1 ⊕λ s2 be spending function such that for each agent a,
(s1 ⊕λ s2)(a) =
{
s1(a) + s2(a), if λ(a) ≥ 0,
0, otherwise.
The desired property, expressed in terms of operation ⊕λ, is stated later as
Lemma 6. We start with two auxiliary observations.
Lemma 4 λ(b) · s1(b) ≤ λ(b) · (s1 ⊕λ s2)(b) for any social network (A, w, λ, θ),
any agent b ∈ A, and any two spending functions s1 and s2.
Proof. We consider the following two cases separately:
Case I: λ(b) ≥ 0. In this case by Definition 6 and because s2(b) ≥ 0 due
to Definition 2, we have s1(b) ≤ s1(b) + s2(b) = (s1 ⊕λ s2)(b). Therefore,
λ(b) · s1(b) ≤ λ(b) · (s1 ⊕λ s2)(b) by the assumption λ(b) ≥ 0.
Case II: λ(b) < 0. In this case by Definition 6 and because s1(b) ≥ 0 due
to Definition 2, we have s1(b) ≥ 0 = (s1 ⊕λ s2)(b). Therefore, λ(b) · s1(b) ≤
λ(b) · (s1 ⊕λ s2)(b) by the assumption λ(b) < 0. 
Now we prove that the spending function s1 ⊕λ s2 is at least as effective as
s1.
Lemma 5 Ans1 ⊆ Ans1⊕λs2 , for any social network (A, w, λ, θ), any set A ⊆ A,
any n ≥ 0, any propensity function λ, and any two spending function s1 and s2.
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Proof. We show the lemma by induction on n. If n = 0, then, by Defini-
tion 4, A0s1 = A = A
0
s1⊕λs2 . Suppose that A
n
s1 ⊆ Ans1⊕λs2 . We need to show
that An+1s1 ⊆ An+1s1⊕λs2 . Indeed, by Definition 4, Lemma 4, and the induction
hypothesis,
An+1s1 = A
n
s1 ∪
b ∈ A | λ(b) · s1(b) + ∑
a∈Ans1
w(a, b) ≥ θ(b)

⊆ Ans1⊕λs2 ∪
b ∈ A | λ(b) · (s1 ⊕λ s2)(b) + ∑
a∈Ans1⊕λs2
w(a, b) ≥ θ(b)

= An+1s1⊕λs2 .

Finally, we are ready to state and prove that a marketing campaign with
spending function s1⊕λ s2 is at least as effective as a sequential combination of
two marketing campaigns with spending functions s1 and s2. This property is
used in Lemma 12 to prove the soundness of Transitivity axiom for promotional
marketing.
Lemma 6 (A∗s1)
∗
s2 ⊆ A∗s1⊕λs2 , for any social network (A, w, λ, θ), any set A ⊆A, any propensity function λ, and any two spending function s1 and s2.
Proof. By Corollary 3, there are n1, n2 ≥ 0 such that A∗s1 = An1s1 and (An1s1 )∗s2 =
(An1s1 )
n2
s2 . Thus,
(A∗s1)
∗
s2 = (A
n1
s1 )
n2
s2
⊆ (An1s1⊕λs2)n2s2 by Lemma 5 and Lemma 2
⊆ (An1s1⊕λs2)n2s2⊕λs1 by Lemma 5
⊆ (An1s1⊕λs2)n2s1⊕λs2 by Definition 6
⊆ An1+n2s1⊕λs2 by Corollary 1
⊆ A∗s1⊕λs2 by Definition 5.

3 Logic of Promotional Marketing
There are two logical systems that we study in this paper. In this section we
introduce a logical system for the marketing aiming to promote influence and
prove its soundness and completeness. In the next section we do the same for
the marketing aiming to prevent influence.
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3.1 Syntax and Semantics
We start by defining the syntax of our logical systems. The logic of promotional
marketing and the logic of preventive marketing use the same language Φ(A),
but different semantics.
Definition 7 For any finite set A, let Φ(A) be the minimum set of formulas
such that
1. ApB ∈ Φ(A) for all subsets A and B of set A and all non-negative real
numbers p,
2. ¬ϕ ∈ Φ(A) for all ϕ ∈ Φ(A),
3. ϕ→ ψ ∈ Φ(A) for all ϕ,ψ ∈ Φ(A).
The next definition is the key definition of this section. Its item 1 specifies
the influence relation in a social network with a fixed marketing budget.
Definition 8 For any social network N with the set of agents A and any for-
mula ϕ ∈ Φ(A), we define satisfiability relation N  ϕ as follows:
1. N  Ap B if B ⊆ A∗s for some spending function s such that ‖s‖ ≤ p,
2. N  ¬ψ if N 2 ψ,
3. N  ψ → χ if N 2 ψ or N  χ.
For example, as we have seen in the introduction, for social network N depicted
in Figure 1, we have {x, z} ⊆ {v}∗s, where spending function s is defined by
equation (3). Thus, N  {v}3 {x, z}. Through the rest of the paper we omit
curly braces from the formulas like this and write them simply as N  v3 x, z.
3.2 Axioms
Let A be any fixed finite set of agents. Our logical system for promotional
influence, in addition to propositional tautologies in language Φ(A), contains
the following axioms:
1. Reflexivity: Ap B, where B ⊆ A,
2. Augmentation: Ap B → A,C p B,C,
3. Transitivity: Ap B → (B q C → Ap+q C).
We write ` ϕ if formula ϕ ∈ Φ(A) is derivable in this logical system using
Modus Ponens inference rule. We write X ` ϕ if formula ϕ is derivable using
an additional set of axioms X ⊆ Φ(A).
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3.3 Examples
The soundness and the completeness of our logical system will be shown later.
In this section we give several examples of formal proofs in our system. We start
with a form of the monotonicity statement from the introduction. As the next
lemma shows, this statement is provable in our logic of promotional marketing
when p ≤ q:
Lemma 7 ` Ap B → Aq B, where p ≤ q.
Proof. By Transitivity axiom, ` Aq−p A→ (Ap B → Aq B). At the same
time, ` A q−p A by Reflexivity axiom. Thus, ` A p B → A q B by Modus
Ponens inference rule. 
Lemma 8 ` Ap B → (Aq C → Ap+q B,C).
Proof. By Augmentation axiom,
` Ap B → Ap A,B (4)
and
` Aq C → A,B q B,C. (5)
By Transitivity axiom,
` Ap A,B → (A,B q B,C → Ap+q B,C). (6)
The statement of the lemma follows from statements (4), (5), and (6) by the
laws of propositional logic. 
The next lemma will be used later in the proof of the completeness.
Lemma 9 Let X be a subset of Φ(A), m be a non-negative integer number, sets
A,B1, . . . , Bm be subsets of A, and p1, . . . , pm be non-negative real numbers. If
X ` Api Bi for all 1 ≤ i ≤ m, then X ` Aq ⋃mi=1Bi, where q = ∑mi=1 pi.
Proof. We prove the lemma by induction on m. If m = 0, then we need to show
that X ` A0 ∅, which is an instance of Reflexivity axiom.
Suppose that X ` Aq′⋃m−1i=1 Bi, where q′ = ∑m−1i=1 pi. Since X ` ApmBm
due to the assumption of the lemma, by Lemma 8, X ` A q ⋃mi=1Bi, where
q =
∑m
i=1 pi. 
3.4 Soundness
In this section we prove the soundness of the logic for promotional marketing.
Theorem 1 For any finite set A and any ϕ ∈ Φ(A), if ` ϕ, then N  ϕ for
each social network N = (A, w, λ, θ).
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The soundness of propositional tautologies and of Modus Ponens inference
rule is straightforward. Below we show the soundness of each of the remaining
axioms as a separate lemma.
Lemma 10 N  A p B, for any social network N = (A, w, λ, θ) and any
subsets A and B of A such that B ⊆ A.
Proof. Let s be the spending function equal to 0 on each a ∈ A. Thus,
‖s‖ = 0 ≤ p by Definition 3. At the same time, B ⊆ A ⊆ A∗s by Corol-
lary 2. Therefore, N  Ap B by Definition 8. 
Lemma 11 If N  A p B, then N  A,C p B,C, for each social network
N = (A, w, λ, θ) and all subsets A, B, and C of A.
Proof. Suppose that N  A p B. Thus, by Definition 8, there is a spending
function s such that ‖s‖ ≤ p and B ⊆ A∗s . Note that C ⊆ C∗s by Corollary 2.
Thus, B ∪C ⊆ A∗s ∪C∗s ⊆ (A∪C)∗s by Lemma 3. Therefore, N  A,C pB,C,
by Definition 8. 
Lemma 12 For any social network N = (A, w, λ, θ), if N  A p B and N 
B q C, then N  Ap+q C.
Proof. By Definition 8, assumption N  BqC implies that there is a spending
function s1 such that ‖s1‖ ≤ q and C ⊆ B∗s1 .
Similarly, assumption N  Ap B implies that there is a spending function
s2 such that ‖s2‖ ≤ p and B ⊆ A∗s2 . Hence, B∗s1 ⊆ (A∗s2)∗s1 by Corollary 4.
Thus, B∗s1 ⊆ A∗s1⊕λs2 by Lemma 6.
It follows that C ⊆ B∗s1 ⊆ A∗s1⊕λs2 . At the same time, ‖s1 ⊕λ s2‖ ≤‖s1‖ + ‖s2‖ ≤ p + q, by Definition 6. Therefore, N  A p+q C by Defini-
tion 8. 
This concludes the proof of the soundness of our logical system for promo-
tional marketing.
3.5 Completeness
We now show the completeness of our logical system for promotional marketing.
This result is formally stated as Theorem 2 in the end of this section. As usual,
at the core of the proof of the completeness is a construction of a canonical
model. In our case, the role of a canonical model is played by the canonical
social network.
Let A0 be any finite set and X = {Ai pi Bi}i≤m be any finite set of
atomic formulas in language Φ(A0). We now proceed to define the canonical
social network NX = (A, w, λ, θ). An example of the canonical network for set
X consisting of formula a, c 1 d, formula b, c 2 a, and formula a, b 3 c is
12
a b
c
β3
β1
β2
d
α2
α3
α1
A0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
λ: 1, θ: 2
1
λ: 0, θ: 1
λ: 0, θ: 1 λ: 0, θ: 1
λ: 0, θ: 1
λ: 1, θ: 1
λ: 1, θ: 3
λ: 0, θ: 3
λ: 0, θ: 3
λ: 0, θ: 3
Figure 3: The canonical social network NX for set X consisting of formula
a, c1 d, formula b, c2 a, and formula a, b3 c.
depicted in Figure 3. We associate two new agents αi and βi with each formula
Ai pi Bi ∈ X. We assume that agents α1, . . . , αm, β1, . . . , βm are distinct and
that they do not belong to set A0.
Definition 9 A = A0 ∪ {αi}i≤m ∪ {βi}i≤m.
In social network NX only agents {αi}i≤m are responsive to promotional
marketing. We formally capture this through the following definition of function
λ:
Definition 10 For any a ∈ A,
λ(a) =
{
1, if a = αi for some i ≤ m,
0, otherwise.
We assume that for each i ≤ m, all agents in set Ai as well as agent αi
put peer pressure on agent βi once they adopt the product. In addition, upon
adopting the product, agent βi puts peer pressure on each agent in set Bi.
Besides that, no agent can put peer pressure on any other agent in this network.
We formally capture this in Definition 11.
Definition 11
w(a, b) =

1, if a ∈ Ai ∪ {αi} and b = βi for some i ≤ m,
1, if a = βi and b ∈ Bi for some i ≤ m,
0, otherwise.
Before continuing with the definition of the social network NX , we state
and prove a property of this network that follows from Definition 11. We show
that in order to put peer pressure of at least |Ai|+ 1 on agent βi, one needs to
influence agent αi and all of the agents in set Ai.
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Lemma 13 If
∑
a∈Ans w(a, βi) ≥ |Ai|+ 1, then αi ∈ Ans and Ai ⊆ Ans .
Proof. By Definition 11, w(a, βi) = 1 if a ∈ Ai ∪ {αi} and w(a, βi) = 0 for
all other a ∈ A. Thus, inequality ∑a∈Ans w(a, βi) ≥ |Ai| + 1 implies that
Ai ∪ {αi} ⊆ Ans . Therefore, αi ∈ Ans and Ai ⊆ Ans . 
We are now ready to define the threshold value function θ for the social
network NX . Recall that according to Definition 11 and Definition 10, no agent
can put peer pressure on agent αi, but agent αi is responsive to promotional
marketing. We set the threshold value θ(αi) to pi so that this agent can only
be influenced by a marketing campaign with budget at least pi. We set value
θ(βi) high enough to guarantee (see Lemma 13) that agent αi and each agent
in set Ai adopt the product before agent βi is influenced. Threshold values of
all agents in set A0 are set to 1.
Definition 12
θ(a) =

pi, if a = αi for some i ≤ m,
|Ai|+ 1, if a = βi for some i ≤ m,
1, otherwise.
This concludes the definition of the canonical social network NX = (A, w, λ, θ).
Recall that Figure 3 depicts the canonical social network NX for set X
consisting of formula a, c1 d, formula b, c2 a, and formula a, b3 c. Note that
formula a, c1 d, formula b, c2 a, and formula a, b3 c are all satisfied in the
canonical network depicted in Figure 3. For example, for the formula a, c1 d,
let spending function s be such that it spends 1 on agent αi and nothing on all
other agents. Thus, {a, c}1s = {a, c, α1}. Once α1 adopts the product, the total
peer pressure on agent β1 becomes 3 and it too adopts the product: {a, c}2s =
{a, c, α1, β1}. Finally, upon adopting of the product, agent β1 alone puts enough
pressure on agent d to also adopt the product: {a, c}3s = {a, c, α1, β1, d}. Thus,
formula a, c1 d is satisfied in this network.
The next lemma generalizes the observation made in the previous paragraph
to a claim that all formulas from set X = {Ai pi Bi}i≤m are satisfied in the
canonical network NX .
Lemma 14 NX  Ai pi Bi for each i ≤ m.
Proof. Consider any i ≤ m. Let s be a spending function such that
s(a) =
{
pi, if a = αi,
0, otherwise.
(7)
Then, by Definition 10, Definition 11, and Definition 12,
λ(αi) · s(αi) +
∑
a∈Ai
w(a, αi) = 1 · pi +
∑
a∈Ai
0 = pi = θ(αi).
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Thus, αi ∈ (Ai)1s by Definition 4. Hence, by Definition 10, Definition 11, and
Definition 12,
λ(βi) · s(βi) +
∑
a∈(Ai)1s
w(a, βi) ≥ λ(βi) · s(βi) + w(αi, βi) +
∑
a∈Ai
w(a, βi)
≥ 0 · 0 + 1 + |Ai| = 1 + |Ai| = θ(βi).
Thus, βi ∈ (Ai)2s by Definition 4. Finally, for each b ∈ Bi, by Definition 10,
Definition 11, and Definition 12,
λ(b) · s(b) +
∑
a∈(Ai)2s
w(a, b) ≥ 0 · 0 + w(βi, b) = w(βi, b) = 1 = θ(b).
Hence, b ∈ (Ai)3s by Definition 4. Thus, b ∈ (Ai)∗s by Definition 5 for each
b ∈ Bi. Then, Bi ⊆ A∗s. Note that ‖s‖ = pi due to definition (7). Therefore,
NX  Ai pi Bi by Definition 8. 
Our next important result is the converse of Lemma 14 stated later as
Lemma 22. In preparation for its, we make several technical observations about
the social network NX . First, we prove that, for each i ≤ m, agent βi can not
be influenced without agent αi being influenced as well.
Lemma 15 If βi ∈ Ans , then αi ∈ Ans , for each A ⊆ A0, each i ≤ m, and each
n ≥ 0.
Proof. Suppose βi ∈ Ans . Let k be the smallest integer such that 0 ≤ k ≤ n and
βi ∈ Aks .
If k = 0, then βi ∈ A0s = A by Definition 4. Thus, βi ∈ A0 due to the
assumption A ⊆ A0, which contradicts the choice of β1, . . . , βm. Therefore, the
lemma is vacuously true.
Suppose that k > 0. Since k > 0 is the smallest integer such that βi ∈ Aks ,
it must be that βi ∈ Aks \Ak−1s . Thus, by Definition 4,
λ(βi) · s(βi) +
∑
a∈Ak−1s
w(a, βi) ≥ θ(βi).
By Definition 10, λ(βi) = 0. By Definition 12, θ(βi) = |Ai|+ 1. Thus,∑
a∈Ak−1s
w(a, βi) ≥ |Ai|+ 1.
Thus, αi ∈ Ak−1s by Lemma 13. Hence, αi ∈ Ak−1s . Therefore, αi ∈ Ans by
Definition 4 and since k − 1 < k ≤ n. 
The next lemma shows that the only way to influence agent αi is to spend
at least pi on promotional marketing to this agent.
Lemma 16 If αi ∈ Ans , then s(αi) ≥ pi, for each A ⊆ A0.
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Proof. Suppose that αi ∈ Ans . Note that αi /∈ A0 ⊇ A = A0s by the choice of
α1, . . . , αm. Thus, by Definition 4, there is k < n such that
λ(αi) · s(αi) +
∑
a∈Aks
w(a, αi) ≥ θ(αi).
By Definition 11, w(a, αi) = 0 for each a ∈ A. Hence, λ(αi) · s(αi) ≥ θ(αi).
By Definition 10, λ(αi) = 1. By Definition 12, θ(αi) = pi. Therefore, s(αi) ≥
pi. 
Lemma 17 For each n ≥ 0 and each subset A of A0, if βi ∈ An+1s \ Ans , then
X ` (Ans ∩ A0)pi Bi.
Proof. By Definition 4, assumption βi ∈ An+1s \Ans implies that
λ(βi) · s(βi) +
∑
a∈Ans
w(a, βi) ≥ θ(βi).
By Definition 10, λ(βi) = 0. Thus,
∑
a∈Ans w(a, βi) ≥ θ(βi). Hence, by Defini-
tion 12,
∑
a∈Ans w(a, βi) ≥ |Ai|+ 1. Thus, Ai ⊆ Ans by Lemma 13. Recall that
Ai ⊆ A0 by the choice of set X. Hence, Ai ⊆ Ans ∩A0. Then, ` (Ans ∩A0)0Ai
by Reflexivity axiom. Recall that Ai pi Bi ∈ X. Thus, X ` (Ans ∩ A0)pi Bi
by Transitivity axiom. 
Lemma 18 X ` (Ans ∩ A0)q ⋃βi∈An+1s \Ans Bi, where q = ∑βi∈An+1s \Ans pi.
Proof. The statement of the lemma follows from Lemma 17 and Lemma 9. 
Lemma 19 X ` (Ans ∩A0)q ((An+2s \An+1s )∩A0), where q = ∑βi∈An+1s \Ans pi,
for each subset A of A0, each spending function s, and each n ≥ 0.
Proof. By Definition 4,
(An+2s \An+1s ) ∩ A0 =
b ∈ A0
∣∣∣∣∣∣ λ(b) · s(b) +
∑
a∈An+1s
w(a, b) ≥ θ(b)

\
b ∈ A0
∣∣∣∣∣∣ λ(b) · s(b) +
∑
a∈Ans
w(a, b) ≥ θ(b)
 .
By Definition 10, λ(b) = 0 for all b ∈ A0. By Definition 12, θ(b) = 1 for all
b ∈ A0. Thus,
(An+2s \An+1s ) ∩ A0 =
b ∈ A0
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
a∈An+1s
w(a, b) ≥ 1
 \
b ∈ A0
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
a∈Ans
w(a, b) ≥ 1
 .
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Since α1, . . . , αm, β1, . . . βm /∈ A0, by Definition 11, for each b ∈ A0, we have
w(a, b) 6= 0 only if a = βi and b ∈ Bi for some i ≤ m, in which case w(a, b) = 1.
Hence,
(An+2s \An+1s ) ∩ A0 =
⋃
βi∈An+1s \Ans
Bi.
Thus, to finish the proof of the lemma, it is sufficient to show that
X ` (Ans ∩ A0)q ⋃
βi∈An+1s \Ans
Bi,
where q =
∑
βi∈An+1s \Ans pi, which follows from Lemma 18. 
Lemma 20 X ` Aq(A1s∩A0), for each subset A of A0, each spending function
s, and each non-negative real number q.
Proof. By Definition 4,
A1s ∩ A0 = (A ∩ A0) ∪
{
b ∈ A0
∣∣∣∣∣ λ(b) · s(b) + ∑
a∈A
w(a, b) ≥ θ(b)
}
.
By Definition 10, λ(b) = 0 for all b ∈ A0. By Definition 12, θ(b) = 1 for all
b ∈ A0. Thus,
A1s ∩ A0 = (A ∩ A0) ∪
{
b ∈ A0
∣∣∣∣∣ ∑
a∈A
w(a, b) ≥ 1
}
.
By Definition 11, w(a, b) = 0 for all a ∈ A ⊆ A0 and all b ∈ A0. Thus, the set{
b ∈ A0
∣∣∣∣∣ ∑
a∈A
w(a, b) ≥ 1
}
is empty. Hence, A1s ∩A0 = A ∩A0. Therefore, X ` Aq (A1s ∩A0) by Reflex-
ivity axiom. 
Lemma 21 X ` Aq (An+1s ∩A0), where q = ∑βi∈Ans pi, for each subset A ofA0, each spending function s, and each n ≥ 0.
Proof. We prove this lemma by induction on n. If n = 0, then the required
follows from Lemma 20.
Assume now that
X ` Aq (An+1s ∩ A0), (8)
where q =
∑
βi∈Ans pi.
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Note that Ans ⊆ An+1s by Definition 4. Hence, ` (An+1s ∩ A0)0 (Ans ∩ A0)
by Reflexivity axiom. At the same time, by Lemma 19,
X ` (Ans ∩ A0)r ((An+2s \An+1s ) ∩ A0),
where r =
∑
βi∈An+1s \Ans pi. Thus, by Transitivity axiom,
X ` (An+1s ∩ A0)r ((An+2s \An+1s ) ∩ A0).
Then, by Augmentation axiom,
X ` (An+1s ∩ A0), (An+1s ∩ A0)r ((An+2s \An+1s ) ∩ A0), (An+1s ∩ A0).
In other words,
X ` (An+1s ∩ A0)r (An+2s ∩ A0). (9)
Therefore, by Transitivity axiom from statement (8) and (9) we can conclude
X ` Aq′ (An+2s ∩ A0), where q′ = q + r = ∑βi∈An+1s pi. 
We are now ready to prove the converse of Lemma 14.
Lemma 22 If NX  A p B, then X ` A p B, for each subsets A and B of
A0 and each non-negative real number p.
Proof. Suppose that NX  ApB. By Definition 8, there is a spending function
s such that ‖s‖ ≤ p and B ⊆ A∗s. Thus, by Corollary 3, there is n ≥ 0 such that
B ⊆ Ans . By Definition 4, Ans ⊆ An+1s . Thus, B ⊆ An+1s . Since B is a subset
of A0, we have B ⊆ An+1s ∩ A0. Hence, ` (An+1 ∩ A0) 0 B by Reflexivity
axiom. Then, from Transitivity axiom and Lemma 21, we have X ` A q B,
where q =
∑
βi∈Ans pi.
Note that
∑
βi∈Ans pi ≤
∑
αi∈Ans pi by Lemma 15 and
∑
αi∈Ans pi ≤
∑
s(αi)≥pi pi
by Lemma 16. Thus, taking into account Definition 3,
q =
∑
βi∈Ans
pi ≤
∑
αi∈Ans
pi ≤
∑
s(αi)≥pi
pi ≤
∑
s(αi)≥pi
s(αi) ≤
∑
a∈A
s(a) = ‖s‖ ≤ p.
Hence, q ≤ p. Then, ` B p−q B by Reflexivity axiom. Finally, X ` A q B
and ` B p−q B, by Transitivity axiom, imply that X ` Ap B. 
We conclude this section by stating and proving the completeness theorem
for promotional marketing.
Theorem 2 If 0 ϕ, then there exists social network N = (A, w, λ, θ) such that
ϕ ∈ Φ(A) and N 2 ϕ.
Proof. Suppose that 0 ϕ. Let M be any maximal consistent subset of
{ψ,¬ψ | ψ is a subformula of ¬ψ}
such that ¬ψ ∈M . Let X be the set of all atomic formulas of the form Ap B
in set M . To finish the proof of the theorem, we first establish the following
lemma:
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Lemma 23 ψ ∈M if and only if NX  ψ for each subformula ψ of ¬ϕ.
Proof. We prove the lemma by induction on the structural complexity of formula
ψ. In the base case, suppose that ψ is Ap B.
(⇒) If ApB ∈M , then ApB ∈ X by the choice of set X. Thus, NX  ApB
by Lemma 14.
(⇐) If NX  A p B, then X ` A p B by Lemma 22. Thus, M ` A p B.
Hence, by the maximality of set M , we have A p B ∈ M since A p B is a
subformula of ¬ϕ.
The induction step follows from the induction hypothesis, the maximality
and the consistency of set M and Definition 8 in the standard way. 
To finish the proof of the theorem, note that ¬ϕ ∈ M by the choice of set
M . Thus, NX  ¬ψ by Lemma 23. Therefore, NX 2 ψ by Definition 8. 
4 Logic of Preventive Marketing
In this section we study the impact of preventive marketing on influence in
social networks. Our definition of a social network given in Definition 1 and the
language Φ(A) remain the same. As it has been discussed in the introduction,
we only modify the meaning of the influence relation A p B to be “for any
preventive marketing campaign with budget no more than p, the set of agents
A is able to influence the set of agents B”. The latter is formally captured in
item 1 of Definition 13.
Definition 13 For any social network N with the set of agents A and any
formula ϕ ∈ Φ(A), we define the satisfiability relation N  ϕ as follows:
1. N  Ap B if B ⊆ A∗s for each spending function s such that ‖s‖ ≤ p,
2. N  ¬ψ if N 2 ψ,
3. N  ψ → χ if N 2 ψ or N  χ.
Note the significant difference between the above definition and the similar
Definition 8 for promotional marketing. Item 1 of Definition 13 has a universal
quantifier over spending functions and corresponding part of Definition 8 has
an existential quantifier over spending functions.
4.1 Axioms
Let A be any fixed finite set of agents. Our logical system for influence with
preventive marketing, in addition to propositional tautologies in language Φ(A),
contains the following axioms:
1. Reflexivity: Ap B, where B ⊆ A,
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2. Augmentation: Ap B → A,C p B,C,
3. Transitivity: Ap B → (B p C → Ap C),
4. Monotonicity: Ap B → Aq B, where q ≤ p.
Just like in the case of promotional marketing, we write ` ϕ if formula ϕ ∈ Φ(A)
is derivable in our logical system using Modus Ponens inference rule. We write
X ` ϕ if formula ϕ is derivable using an additional set of axioms X ⊆ Φ(A).
4.2 Example
The soundness and the completeness of our logical system will be shown later.
In this section we give two examples of formal proofs in our system. First, we
show a preventive marketing analogy of Lemma 8:
Lemma 24 ` Ap B → (Ap C → Ap B,C).
Proof. By Augmentation axiom,
` Ap B → Ap A,B (10)
and
` Ap C → A,B p B,C. (11)
By Transitivity axiom,
` Ap A,B → (A,B p B,C → Ap B,C). (12)
The statement of the lemma follows from statements (10), (11), and (12) by the
laws of the propositional logic. 
Next, we show an auxiliary lemma that is used later in the proof of com-
pleteness.
Lemma 25 If X ` B p c for each c ∈ C, then X ` B p C, where B and C
are subsets of A0 and p ≥ 0.
Proof. We prove the lemma by induction on the size of set C.
Base Case: X ` B p ∅ by Reflexivity axiom.
Induction Step: Assume that X ` Bp C. Let c be any element of A0 \C such
that X ` B p c. We need to show that X ` B p C ∪ {c}. By Augmentation
axiom,
X ` B ∪ {c}p C ∪ {c}. (13)
Recall that X ` B p c. Again by Augmentation axiom, X ` B p B ∪ {c}.
Hence, X ` B p C ∪ {c}, due to (13) and Transitivity axiom. 
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4.3 Soundness
In this section we prove the soundness of the logic for preventive marketing.
Theorem 3 For any finite set A and any ϕ ∈ Φ(A), if ` ϕ, then N  ϕ for
each social network N = (A, w, λ, θ).
The soundness of propositional tautologies and of Modus Ponens inference
rule is straightforward. Below we show the soundness of each of the remaining
axioms as a separate lemma.
Lemma 26 N  A p B, for any social network N = (A, w, λ, θ) and any
subsets A and B of A such that B ⊆ A.
Proof. Let s be any spending function. By Definition 13, it suffices to show
that B ⊆ A∗s. Indeed, A ⊆ A∗s by Corollary 2. Therefore, B ⊆ A∗s due to the
assumption B ⊆ A of the lemma. 
Lemma 27 If N  A p B, then N  A,C p B,C, for each social network
N = (A, w, λ, θ) and all subsets A, B, and C of A.
Proof. Suppose that N  A p B. Consider any spending function s such
that ‖s‖ ≤ p. It suffices to show that B ∪ C ⊆ (A ∪ C)∗s. Indeed, assumption
N  Ap B implies that B ⊆ A∗s by Definition 13. At the same time, C ⊆ C∗s
by Corollary 2. Therefore, B ∪ C ⊆ A∗s ∪ C∗s ⊆ (A ∪ C)∗s, by Lemma 3. 
Lemma 28 If N  Ap B and N  B p C, then N  Ap C, for each social
network N = (A, w, λ, θ) and all subsets A, B, and C of A.
Proof. Suppose that N  A p B and N  B p C. Consider any spending
function s such that ‖s‖ ≤ p. By Definition 13, it suffices to show that C ⊆ A∗s.
Note that assumption N  A p B, by Definition 13, imply that B ⊆ A∗s.
Thus, B∗s ⊆ (A∗s)∗s by Corollary 4. At the same time, assumption N  B p C
implies that C ⊆ B∗s by Definition 13. Hence, C ⊆ (A∗s)∗s. Therefore, C ⊆ A∗s
by Lemma 1. 
Lemma 29 If N  Ap B, then N  Aq B, for each q ≤ p, each each social
network N = (A, w, λ, θ) and all subsets A and B of A.
Proof. Consider any spending function s such that ‖s‖ ≤ q. By Definition 13,
it suffices to show that B ⊆ A∗s. To prove this, note that ‖s‖ ≤ q ≤ p. Thus,
B ⊆ A∗s due to Definition 13 and the assumption N  ApB of the lemma. 
This concludes the proof of the soundness of our logical system for preventive
marketing.
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4.4 Completeness
The rest of this section contains the proof of the following result.
Theorem 4 If 0 ϕ, then there is a social network N = (A, w, λ, θ) such that
ϕ ∈ Φ(A) and N 2 ϕ.
Suppose that 0 ϕ. It suffices to construct a “canonical” social network
N = (A, w, λ, θ) such that N 2 ϕ. Define P ⊂ R to be the finite set of all
subscripts that appear in formula ϕ. Let ε > 0 be such that |p1− p2| > ε for all
p1, p2 ∈ P where p1 6= p2. Let A0 be the finite set of all agents that appear in
formula ϕ and X be a maximal consistent subset of Φ(A0) containing formula
¬ϕ.
In Section 2, we have introduced closures Aks and A
∗
s of a set of agents A.
Both of these closures are semantic in the sense that they are defined in terms
of a given social network. We are about to introduce another closure A+p that
will be used to construct the canonical social network N . Unlike closures Aks
and A∗s, closure the A
+
p is syntactic because it is defined in terms of provability
of certain statements in our logical system.
Definition 14 A+p = {a ∈ A0 | X ` Ap a}, for any set of agents A ⊆ A0 and
any p ≥ 0.
Lemma 30 X ` Ap A+p , for any A ⊆ A0 and any p ≥ 0.
Proof. The statement of the lemma follows from Definition 14 and Lemma 25.

Generally speaking, it is possible that A+p = A
+
q for some p and q such
that p 6= q. In the construction of the canonical social network N it will be
convenient to distinguish closures A+p for different values of parameter p. In
such situations, instead of closure A+p we consider labeled closure, formally
defined as pair (A+p , p).
Definition 15 Let L = {(A+p , p) | A ⊆ A0, p ∈ P}.
Next we define the canonical network N = (A, w, λ, θ). Besides agents in
set A0, our social network also has two additional agents for each ` ∈ L. By
analogy with the canonical social network NX from the proof of completeness
for promotional marking, we call these additional agents α(`) and β(`).
Definition 16 A = A0 ∪ {α(`), β(`) | ` ∈ L}.
For any ` = (A+p , p), we assume that upon adopting the product agent α(`)
puts peer pressure on agent β(`), agent β(`) puts peer pressure on each agent
in set A0 \ A+p and each agent in set A0 \ A+p , in turn, puts peer pressure on
agent β(`). The peer pressure structure is illustrated in Figure 4. Note that the
same agent a ∈ A0 can belong to set A0 \ A+p for several different values of p.
Such agent a could experience (or put) peer pressure from (on) several different
agents β(`). The structure is formally specified in Definition 17.
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Figure 4: Towards the definition of the influence function in the canonical social
network.
Definition 17 For any a, b ∈ A,
w(a, b) =

1, if a = α(`) and b = β(`) for some ` ∈ L,
1, if a ∈ A0 \A+p and b = β(A+p , p) ∈ L,
1, if a = β(A+p , p) ∈ L and b ∈ A0 \A+p ,
0, otherwise.
We assume that only agents {α(`) | ` ∈ L} are responsive to preventive
marketing. This is formally captured in the definition of the propensity function
below.
Definition 18 For any a ∈ A,
λ(a) =
{
−1, if a = α(`) for some ` ∈ L,
0, otherwise.
To finish the definition of canonical social network N = (A, w, λ, θ), we only
need to define threshold function θ(a) for each a ∈ A. There are three different
cases to consider: a = α(`) for some ` ∈ L, a = β(`) for some ` ∈ L, and a ∈ A0.
Recall that by Definition 17 and Definition 18, agent α(`) is not responsive to
peer pressure of any other agent. It is only responsive to the marketing pressure
with propensity −1. We set the threshold value of this agent to ε − p, where
` = (A+p , p). Thus, if an amount at least p is spent on the preventive marketing
to this agent, it will not adopt the product.
We set threshold value of agent β(`) to 1. Thus, for each ` = (A+p , p), if
either agent α(`) or any of the agents in the set A0 \ A+p adopts the product,
then agent β(`) will also adopt the product.
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Finally, recall from Definition 17 that agent a ∈ A0 can experience peer
pressure from any agent β(A+p , p) such that a ∈ A0 \ A+p . There are exactly
|{(A+p , p) ∈ L | a ∈ A0 \ A+p }| such β-agents. We set the threshold value θ(a)
high enough so that it adopts the product only if all of these β-agents adopt
the product.
The next definition captures the three cases discussed above.
Definition 19 For any a ∈ A,
θ(a) =

ε− p, if a = α(A+p , p),
1, if a = β(A+p , p),
|{(A+p , p) ∈ L | a ∈ A0 \A+p }|, if a ∈ A0.
For any c ∈ A0, we have chosen θ(c) to be equal to the number of β(A+p , p)
such that c ∈ A0 \ A+p . Thus, if all such β-agents adopt the product, then the
total peer pressure on agent c would reach θ(c) and agent c also would adopt
the product. This observation is formalized by the next lemma.
Lemma 31 Let c be an agent in A0, set B be a subset of A0, and s be an
arbitrary spending function for the social network N . If for each (A+p , p) ∈ L at
least one of the following is true: (i) c ∈ A+p , (ii) β(A+p , p) ∈ B∗s , then c ∈ B∗s .
Proof. By Corollary 3, B∗s = B
n
s for some n ≥ 0. Thus, by the assumption of
this lemma, for each (A+p , p) ∈ L at least one of the following is true: (i) c ∈ A+p ,
(ii) β(A+p , p) ∈ Bns . In other words, {β(A+p , p) | c ∈ A0 \A+p } ⊆ Bns . Hence,∑
b∈Bns
w(b, c) ≥
∑
`∈{(A+p ,p)∈L | c∈A0\A+p }
w(β(`), c).
Thus, by Definition 17,∑
b∈Bns
w(b, c) ≥
∑
`∈{(A+p ,p)∈L | c∈A0\A+p }
1 = |{(A+p , p) ∈ L | c ∈ A0 \A+p }|.
At the same time λ(c) = 0 by Definition 18. Hence,
λ(c) · s(c) +
∑
b∈Bns
w(b, c) ≥ |{(A+p , p) ∈ L | c ∈ A0 \A+p }|.
Then, by Definition 19,
λ(c) · s(c) +
∑
b∈Bns
w(b, c) ≥ θ(c).
Thus, c ∈ Bn+1s by Definition 4. Therefore, c ∈ B∗s by Definition 5. 
Referring back to Figure 4, note that if an agent in set A0 \ A+p adopts the
product, then it will put enough pressure on β(A+p , p) so that agent β(A
+
p , p)
also adopts the product. We formally state this observation as the lemma below.
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Lemma 32 If there is b0 ∈ B∗s such that b0 ∈ A0 \ A+p , then β(A+p , p) ∈ B∗s ,
where (A+p , p) ∈ L, set B is a subset of A0, and s is an arbitrary spending
function for the social network N .
Proof. By Corollary 3, B∗s = B
n
s for some n ≥ 0. At the same time, by
Definition 17, assumption b0 ∈ A0 \A+p implies that w(b0, β(A+p , p)) = 1. Thus,∑
b∈Bns
w(b, β(A+p , p)) ≥ w(b0, β(A+p , p)) = 1,
since b0 ∈ B∗s = Bns . Note that λ(β(A+p , p)) = 0 by Definition 18. Hence,
λ(β(A+p , p)) · s(β(A+p , p)) +
∑
b∈Bns
w(b, β(A+p , p)) ≥ w(b0, β(A+p , p)) = 1.
Thus, by Definition 19,
λ(β(A+p , p)) · s(β(A+p , p)) +
∑
b∈Bns
w(b, β(A+p , p)) ≥ θ(β(A+p , p)).
Hence, β(A+p , p) ∈ Bn+1s by Definition 4. Therefore, β(A+p , p) ∈ B∗s by Defini-
tion 5. 
Recall that we have set the threshold value of agent α(A+p , p) to be ε − p,
so that by spending at least p on preventive marketing one would prevent an
adoption of the product by agent α(A+p , p). At the same time, spending no more
than p − ε will result in α(A+p , p) adopting the product. Once agent α(A+p , p)
adopts the product, it will put enough pressure on agent β(A+p , p) to adopt the
product as well. This observation is formally stated below.
Lemma 33 If s(α(A+p , p)) ≤ p − ε, then β(A+p , p) ∈ B∗s , where (A+p , p) ∈ L,
set B is a subset of A0, and s is an arbitrary spending function for the social
network N .
Proof. Suppose that s(α(A+p , p)) ≤ p − ε. Note that λ(α(A+p , p)) = −1 by
Definition 18 and w(b, α(A+p , p)) = 0 for each b ∈ A by Definition 17. Thus,
λ(α(A+p , p)) · s(α(A+p , p)) +
∑
b∈B0s
w(b, α(A+p , p))
= −1 · s(α(A+p , p)) + 0 = −s(α(A+p , p)) ≥ ε− p.
Thus, by Definition 19,
λ(α(A+p , p)) · s(α(A+p , p)) +
∑
b∈B0s
w(b, α(A+p , p)) ≥ θ(α(A+p , p)).
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Hence, α(A+p , p) ∈ B1s by Definition 4. Since w is a non-negative function, by
Definition 17,∑
b∈B1s
w(b, β(A+p , p)) = w(α(A
+
p , p), β(A
+
p , p)) +
∑
b∈B1s\{α(A+p ,p)}
w(b, β(A+p , p))
≥ w(α(A+p , p), β(A+p , p)) = 1.
Note that λ(β(A+p , p)) = 0 by Definition 18. Thus,
λ(β(A+p , p)) · s(β(A+p , p)) +
∑
b∈B1s
w(b, β(A+p , p)) ≥ 1.
Hence, by Definition 19,
λ(β(A+p , p)) · s(β(A+p , p)) +
∑
b∈B1s
w(b, β(A+p , p)) ≥ θ(β(A+p , p)).
Thus, β(A+p , p) ∈ B2s by Definition 4. Therefore, β(A+p , p) ∈ B∗s by Defini-
tion 5. 
The next lemma states that if we do spend at least p on preventive marketing
to agent α(A+p , p), then this agent will never adopt the product.
Lemma 34 For every (A+p , p) ∈ L and every spending function s, if s(α(A+p , p)) ≥
p, then α(A+p , p) /∈ A∗s.
Proof. By Definition 5, it suffices to show that α(A+p , p) /∈ Aks for each k ≥ 0.
We prove this statement by induction on k.
Base Case: By Definition 4, we have A0s = A. At the same time, by Defi-
nition 15, (A+p , p) ∈ L implies that A ⊆ A0. Hence, A0s ⊆ A0. Therefore,
α(A+p , p) /∈ A0s by Definition 16.
Induction Step: Suppose that α(A+p , p) /∈ Aks and α(A+p , p) ∈ Ak+1s . Thus, by
Definition 4,
λ(α(A+p , p)) · s(α(A+p , p)) +
∑
b∈Aks
w(b, α(A+p , p)) ≥ θ(α(A+p , p)).
Hence, by Definition 18, Definition 17, and Definition 19,
1 · s(α(A+p , p)) + 0 ≥ ε− p.
Thus, s(α(A+p , p)) ≤ p − ε. Therefore, s(α(A+p , p)) < p since ε > 0. This con-
tradicts the assumption s(α(A+p , p)) ≥ p of the lemma. 
As we have seen in the previous lemma, spending at least p on preventive
marketing to agent α(A+p , p) prevents it from adopting the product. We now
show that spending at least p on agent α(A+p , p) prevents all agents in setA0\A+p
from adopting the product. See Figure 4.
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Lemma 35 A∗s ∩ A0 ⊆ A+p , where (A+p , p) ∈ L and s is an arbitrary spending
function such that s(α(A+p , p)) ≥ p.
Proof. Let (A+p , p) ∈ L and s be an arbitrary spending function such that
s(α(A+p , p)) ≥ p. By Definition 5, it suffices to show that Aks ∩ A0 ⊆ A+p for
each k ≥ 0. Instead, we prove the following two statements simultaneously by
induction on k: {
Aks ∩ A0 ⊆ A+p ,
β(A+p , p) /∈ Aks .
Base Case: Suppose that a ∈ A0s. Thus, a ∈ A by Definition 4. Hence, ` Ap a
by Reflexivity axiom. Therefore, a ∈ A+p by Definition 14. Assume now that
β(A+p , p) ∈ A0s. Thus, β(A+p , p) ∈ A ⊆ A0 by Definition 4 and Definition 15,
which is a contradiction with β(A+p , p) /∈ A0 by the choice of α(`) and β(`).
Induction Step: Assume that {
Aks ∩ A0 ⊆ A+p ,
β(A+p , p) /∈ Aks .
We need to show that {
Ak+1s ∩ A0 ⊆ A+p ,
β(A+p , p) /∈ Ak+1s .
(14)
To prove the first statement, suppose that there is a ∈ A0 such that a ∈ Ak+1s \
A+p . Note that a /∈ Aks by the induction hypothesis. Thus, by Definition 4,
λ(a) · s(a) +
∑
b∈Aks
w(b, a) ≥ θ(a).
Hence, by Definition 18 and Definition 19,
0 · s(a) +
∑
b∈Aks
w(b, a) ≥ |{(A+q , q) ∈ L | a ∈ A0 \A+q }|.
Therefore, by Definition 17,∑
`∈{(A+q ,q)∈L | a∈A0\A+q ,β(`)∈Aks}
w(β(`), a) ≥ |{(A+q , q) ∈ L | a ∈ A0 \A+q }|.
Hence, again by Definition 17,∑
`∈{(A+q ,q)∈L | a∈A0\A+q ,β(`)∈Aks}
1 ≥ |{(A+q , q) ∈ L | a ∈ A0 \A+q }|.
Thus,
|{(A+q , q) ∈ L | a ∈ A0 \A+q , β(`) ∈ Aks}| ≥ |{(A+q , q) ∈ L | a ∈ A0 \A+q }|.
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At the same time,
{(A+q , q) ∈ L | a ∈ A0 \A+q , β(`) ∈ Aks} ⊆ {(A+q , q) ∈ L | a ∈ A0 \A+q }.
Then it must be the case that
{(A+q , q) ∈ L | a ∈ A0 \A+q , β(`) ∈ Aks} = {(A+q , q) ∈ L | a ∈ A0 \A+q }.
Hence, β(`) ∈ Aks for all ` ∈ {(A+q , q) ∈ L | a ∈ A0 \ A+q }. In particular,
β(A+p , p) ∈ Aks , which is a contradiction to the induction hypothesis.
To prove the second statement from (14), suppose that β(A+p , p) ∈ Ak+1s .
Note that β(A+p , p) /∈ Aks due to the induction hypothesis. Thus, by Definition 4,
λ(β(A+p , p)) · s(β(A+p , p)) +
∑
b∈Aks
w(b, β(A+p , p)) ≥ θ(β(A+p , p)).
Hence, by Definition 18 and Definition 19,
0 · s(β(A+p , p)) +
∑
b∈Aks
w(b, β(A+p , p)) ≥ 1.
Thus, there must exist at least one b ∈ Aks such that w(b, β(A+p , p)) > 0. By
Definition 17 and Lemma 34, this implies that b ∈ A0 \ A+p , which is a contra-
diction to the first part of the induction hypothesis, i.e. Aks ∩ A0 ⊆ A+p . 
Lemma 36 For each B,C ⊆ A0 and each q ∈ P , if B q C ∈ X, then N 
B q C.
Proof. Consider any spending function s such that ‖s‖ ≤ q. By Definition 13, it
suffices to show that C ⊆ B∗s . Suppose that there is c0 ∈ C such that c0 /∈ B∗s .
Thus, by Lemma 31, there exists (A+p , p) ∈ L such that c0 /∈ A+p and
β(A+p , p) /∈ B∗s . The latter, by Lemma 32, implies that B∗s ∩ (A0 \ A+p ) = ∅.
Hence, (B∗s ∩ A0) \ A+p = ∅. Then, B∗s ∩ A0 ⊆ A+p . Thus, B ⊆ B∗s ∩ A0 ⊆ A+p
by Definition 4 and Definition 5. We next consider the following two cases:
Case I: p ≤ q. In this case, assumption B q C ∈ X, by Monotonicity axiom,
implies that X ` B p C. At the same time, by Reflexivity axiom, B ⊆ A+p
implies that ` A+p p B. Thus, X ` A+p p C by Transitivity axiom. Again by
Reflexivity axiom, we have ` C p c0. Hence, X ` A+p p c0 by Transitivity
axiom. Thus, X ` A p c0 by Lemma 30 and Transitivity axiom. Therefore,
c0 ∈ A+p , which is a contradiction with the choice of set A.
Case II: p > q. Then, p− ε > q by the choice of ε. Hence,
s(α(A+p , p)) ≤ ‖s‖ ≤ q < p− ε.
Therefore, β(A+p , p) ∈ B∗s by Lemma 33, which is a contradiction with the choice
of set A. 
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Lemma 37 For each B,C ⊆ A0 and each q ∈ P , if N  BqC, then BqC ∈
X.
Proof. Suppose that B q C /∈ X. Thus, by Lemma 25 and the maximality of
set X, there is c0 ∈ C such that X 0 Bq c0. Hence, c0 /∈ B+q by Definition 14.
Consider spending function s such that
s(a) =
{
q, if a = α(B+q , q),
0, otherwise.
Note that ‖s‖ = q. Thus, C ⊆ B∗s by the assumption N  BqC of the lemma.
Hence, c0 ∈ B∗s . This together with c0 /∈ B+q contradicts with Lemma 35 and
c0 ∈ C ⊆ A0. 
Lemma 38 ψ ∈ X iff N  ψ, for each ψ ∈ Φ(A0).
Proof. We prove the lemma by induction on the structural complexity of formula
ψ. The base case follows from Lemma 36 and Lemma 37. The induction step
follows from Definition 13 and maximality and consistency of set X in the
standard way. 
To finish the proof of Theorem 4 note that ¬ϕ ∈ X due to the choice of the set
X. Thus, ϕ /∈ X due to consistency of set X. Therefore, N 2 ϕ by Lemma 38.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we have suggested a way of adding marketing to the standard
threshold model of diffusion in social networks. The model is general enough
to simulate both promotional and preventive marketing. We have also defined
formal logical systems for reasoning about influence relation in social networks
with marketing of these two types. Both systems are based on Armstrong’s
axioms from the database theory. The main technical results of the paper are
the completeness theorems for these two systems. A possible extension of this
work is an analysis of the computational complexity of this model.
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